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By their amended complaint, respondents sought:
;
i i compel appellant to appear and show cause whyit should not be ordered to join with respondents in the
submission of a written statement of an alleged grievance to a jointly acceptable and neutral arbitrator:
(2) an order permitting respondents t< select an arbitrator to proceed with the hearing in the event appellant
failed to so appear; and. (X) in the event the parties
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failed to agree in writing as to the issue to be submitted
to an arbitrator or failed to agree who the arbitrator
should be, respondenes sought an order that the alleged
grievance be submitted to an arbitrator selected by the
court from a list of names submitted by the parties.
D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE
Appellant appeared at the Order to Show Cause
hearing and the same was denied. The Court further
ordered that the matter be set for trial within sixty
(60) days ( R . 3 1 ) .
After the trial, the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, The Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, sitting without a jury, entered Judgment
compelling arbitration of the alleged grievance and appointed Mr. Joseph C. Fratto as the arbitrator to hear
the matter.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment dated
the 13th day of March, 1974, and a direction from this
Court that an arbitrable dispute does not exist between
the parties.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about the 19th day of November, 1972, the
parties entered into a Collective Bargaining Labor
Agreement, hereinafter referred to as the "Agreement."
At the time the Agreement was ratified by the union
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membership, tin company maintained a Company Insurance Plan with the Hon le Insurance Company.
During the collective bargaining between the parties,
the premium for said plan amounted to approximately
$29.00 per month per employee and shortly after ratification, the premium was increased to $31.00 per month
per employee (R. 61) The premiums for tin* company
plan were ft illy paid by appellant with no contribution
by the covered employees (R 63)
i'L llnmt l,iiV Insurance Company notified appellant oh . ! a!«< ui tli IM tiny nf June, 1973, that the
company plan premium was to be increased to the
amount of $41.24 per employee per month (R. 61).
This increase was for the same coverage previously
provided by the existing plan and -si not cover any
modifications or increases in benefits (R. 61) Appellant was dissatisfied with the premium increase by its
existing carrier without concurrent advantages in benefits and ultimately substituted an insurance plan provided by Blue Cross-Blue Shield at a premium of $40.20
per employee per month (R. 62
During the pro** ss of .list routing enrollment cards
lo employees desiring coverage under the new plan, Mr.
Larry Peterson, appellant's claim manager, explained
to respondent«' union steward. Mr, Randy Robinson,
that,
" "[\V je had goi.; '.'U' .;:••; done suinc --ho|i- ping 1<> \ry and find a better pro^rmn for. yon
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i I know, less, which we did. We were going to
have to pay it anyway." (R. 61)
This discussion between Mr. Peterson and Mr.
Robinson occurred approximately July 25, 1973 (R.
60). The enrollment process was completed and the
Blue Cross-Blue Shield policy went into effect August
1, 1973 (R. 58).
On September 16 or 17, 1973, Randy Robinson
telephoned Mr. Neldin Stephenson, business representative for Local 222, and advised Mr. Stephenson of
his understanding that appellant had acquired a new
health and welfare plan with Blue Cross-Blue Shield
that was better than the old plan previously maintained
with Home Life (R. 51). Mr. Robinson did not have
a copy of the new plan but within a day or two was
able to obtain a copy and furnish the same to Mr.
Stephenson (R. 51).
A meeting between respondents and appellant's
representatives was held on the 24th day of September,
1973, at which time respondents requested arbitration
and appellant replied that the subject was not an arbitrable item under the terms of the contract (R. 54).
The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the
parties was not received into evidence at the trial of
this matter. A copy of an Agreement was attached to
respondents' original complaint filed November 28,
1973, but no agreement is attached to respondents'
amended complaint filed December 6, 1973. Appellant's
answer admits that respondents and appellant entered
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into a Collective Bargaining Labor Agreement on or
about the 19th day of November, 1972, affirmatively
alleges that the Agreement speaks for itself and, further,
denies each and every allegation set forth in respondents'
amended complaint not specifically admitted.
I n addition, the record does not include either the
Home Life Insurance Company Plan or the Blue CrossBlue Shield plan. At the trial, the Blue Cross-Blue
Shield plan was introduced and received into evidence
as Exhibit 1-P (R. 15), but at the conclusion of the
hearing, the same was withdrawn by respondents' counsel (R. 72).
Notwithstanding the complete lack of any evidence,
either documentary or through testimony, the lower
court entered judgment against appellant,
"[T]hat the labor dispute between the parties
involving an increase in the benefits provided
by the defendant for its employees who selected
the Company Plan of benefits, be, and it is
hereby, required to be submitted to an arbitrator for a decision and resolution of the dispute."
(R. 18)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
T H E RECORD IS COMPLETELY
D E V O I D OF ANY
EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING
APPELLANTS
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CONTRACTUAL
ARBITRATE.

OBLIGATION

TO

I t is well settled that the duty to arbitrate is contractual and a party may not be compelled to arbitrate
an issue that he has not contractually agreed to arbitrate.
As stated in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376
U.S. 543, 11 L.Ed.2d 898, 84 S.Ct. 909 (1954), at 11
L.Ed.2d 903:
"The duty to arbitrate being of contractual
origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration
cannot precede judicial determination that the
collective bargaining agreement does in fact
create such a duty. Thus, just as an employer
has no obligation to arbitrate issues which it
has not agreed to arbitrate, so a fortioro, it
cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not bind it at all."
The contractual obligation of appellant to arbitrate
respondents' alleged grievance has not been established in this proceeding because the agreement purportedly establishing and defining such an obligation
is not before the Court.
Respondents' original complaint and the exhibits
attached thereto were superseded by respondents' subsequent filing of an amended complaint. As stated in
67 Am J u r 2d, Pleading §334, at 739-740:
An amended pleading which is complete in
itself and does not refer to or adopt a former
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pleading as a part of it supersedes the former
pleading. The original pleading is abandoned
by the amendment and is no longer a part of
the pleaders averments against his adversary,
and the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the
allegations contained in the superseded pleading, unless they are set out in the amended
pleading or referred to therein.
I n this proceeding, respondents' amended complaint is complete in itself and, although the same refers to the subject agreement, a copy thereof is not
attached. Appellant's answer admits the execution of
an agreement, affirmatively alleges that the agreement
would speak for itself, and does not admit the contents
as alleged by respondents. By the pleadings, the existence and scope of the obligation to arbitrate were disputed issues and respondents' failure to establish both
considerations is fatal.
Appellant submits that an exhibit to a superseded
pleading is not within the scope of the evidence to be
considered in determining the rights of party litigants.
The authenticity thereof must be established by competent evidence the same as any other disputed fact.
Without the subject agreement in evidence, the
court had no basis on which to determine the primary
issues of appellant's obligation to arbitrate or the scope
of the issues designated by the agreement as appropriate
for arbitration. Such a devoid record may not support
an order compelling arbitration and the matter must
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be remitted to the lower court for a determination of
whether the agreement in fact creates an obligation on
appellant to arbitrate this particular dispute.
POINT II
T H E RECORD IS COMPLETELY
D E V O I D O F A N Y E V I D E N C E TO
SUPPORT T H E LOWER COURTS
DETERMINATION THAT APPELLANT HAD I N C R E A S E D
THE
B E N E F I T S P R O V I D E D B Y I T S COMPANY INSURANCE PLAN.
The alleged grievance which respondents seek to compel appellant to submit to arbitration is allegedly in
respondents' amended complaint to be,
" [ T ] h a t (appellant) has materially and substantially increased the benefits of the 'Barton
Truck Line Company Plan' (appellant),
which violation constitutes a grievance as to
those certain employees who exercised their
option to select (respondents' insurance plan)
* * * " (R.33)
Appellant specifically denied that it had increased
the benefits provided for in the Company Insurance
Plan and affirmatively alleged that the payment of the
increased premium was necessary to preserve the plan
or its equivalent (R.23). However, respondents' allegation was set forth virtually word for word as paragraph
7 of the lower court's Findings of Fact (R. 16).
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Neither the Home Life Insurance Company Plan
nor the Blue Cross-Blue Shield Plan were introduced
into evidence. In addition, neither plan was attached as
an exhibit to any pleading filed by respondents and no
witness testified as to the relative benefits of each plan.
Without either plan being in evidence so that a comparative analysis could be made, or oral testimony distinguishing the various benefits, there is no competent
evidence on which to support a finding, conclusion or
judgment by the lower court that there was an increase
in benefits provided by one plan over the other. I t is
difficult to conduct a prolonged argument with respect
to the insufficiency of the record in this regard and the
only appropriate comment is that the record, like a
written contract or insurance plan, speaks for itself.
Appellant recognizes the general rule that where
findings of fact are based on conflicting evidence, the
same must stand unless against the clear preponderance
of the evidence. Mollerup v. Daynes-Beebe Music Company, 82 Utah 299, 24 P.2d 306 (1933). However, the
correlary is also true in that findings not supported by
the evidence must be vacated. In this proceeding, there
is no conflicting evidence relating to the alleged increase
in benefits in appellant's presently effective insurance
plan. There is simply no evidence with respect to this
issue at all. Therefore, any finding upholding respondents' allegation of an increase in benefits must be vacated and the judgment thereon reversed.
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POINT III

T H E L O W E R COURT E R R E D I N
DETERMINING T H A T
RESPONDENTS HAD TIMELY REQUESTED
A R B I T R A T I O N P U R S U A N T TO T H E
R E Q U I R E M E N T S OF T H E AGREEMENT.
Appellant's Answer admitted that portion of respondents' amended complaint wherein it was alleged
that Article X X of the Agreement provides that arbitration must be requested,
"[i]n a timely manner within thirty (30)
calendar days of the original event of the
grievance." (R. 24)
At the beginning of the trial, the lower court stated that
the only issue to be considered that particular day was
the issue relating to the timeliness of respondents' request for arbitration and whether the same conformed
to the requirement that arbitration must be requested
within thirty (30) calendar days of the original event
of the grievance.
Respondents' testimony on this issue was supplied
by Mr. Neldin Stephenson who testified that on September 16 or 17, 1973, he was advised by the union steward
that appellant had obtained a new health and welfare
plan (R. 50, 51) and that a copy of the plan was furnished on or about the 18th or 19th day of September,
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1973 (R. 51). Thereafter, the company's request to
submit the issue of the alleged increase in benefits to
an arbitrator was refused by appellant.
Appellant's testimony was supplied by Mr. Larry
Peterson who testified that on or about July 25, 1973,
during the process of distributing enrollment cards for
the new plan, Mr. Peterson advised the union steward
that appellant was obtaining a new program because the
old carrier had increased the premium without any
change in benefits (R. 60, 61). Mr. Peterson further
testified that the new policy went into effect August 1,
1973, (R. 58).
I t may be noted that Mr. Stephenson and Mr.
Peterson were the only witnesses to testify at the trial
and their testimony was limited to the issue relating to
the timeliness of respondents' request for arbitration.
Appellant submits that by its finding that respondents had timely requested arbitration, the lower court
effectively rewrote this particular contractural provision.
The contract is not ambiguous and specifically requires
a request for arbitration within thirty (30) calendar
days of the original event of the grievance. The contractual provision as rewritten by the lower court now
requires a request for arbitration within thirty (30)
calendar days after notice by the unions of the original
event of the grievance. Appellant's contractual obligation has thus been modified by a condition interjected
into the contract after the same has taken effect.
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Respondents specifically claim that the grievance
giving rise to the demand for arbitration is that appellant increased the benefits of its company insurance
plan. The undisputed evidence is that the new plan
went into effect August 1, 1973, and this is clearly the,
" . . . original event of the grievance" identified in the
agreement. A request for arbitration made approximately seven weeks after the original event of the grievance is clearly untimely. Even assuming for the purposes of this argument that the issue between the parties
is a proper subject for arbitration, the contractual obligation of appellant to submit to arbitration is further
limited by the requirement that a request for arbitration
be timely. The timeliness of the request is as critical to
the submission of the issue to an arbitrator as is the
contractual requirement that a particular item is a proper
subject for arbitration. As stated in 51 A.C.J.S. Labor
Relations, §467(b) at 459,
"Conditions precedent and preliminary steps
called for by the contract must be complied
with before the arbitration provision may be
invoked •***"
There was no contention by respondents that appellant purposely tried to conceal the implementation of
the new plan from the union membership, the union
steward or union officials. As a matter of fact, respondents' counsel conceded that possible concealment was
not an issue and the court properly observed,
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" I t isn't. There is no evidence that there was."
(R. 62)
The final observation to be made with respect to
the timeliness of respondents' request for arbitration
is that respondents, through their own union steward,
had notice that appellant was adopting a new insurance
program on or about the 25th day of July, 1973. The
evident failure of the union steward to report this development to his superiors is not a sufficient excuse to
relieve respondents from the requirement of their collective bargaining agreement. I t is interesting to note
that when Mr. Stephenson requested the union steward
to obtain a copy of the new plan, the same was accomplished within one or two days. This same request for
a copy of the new plan could and should have been made
by the union steward when he was advised of its anticipated adoption on July 25, 1973. A copy could have
been reviewed by respondents prior to the plan's effective date of August 1, 1973, and the proper procedures
pursued.
Appellant respectfully submits that the lower court
erred in rewriting the contract to require a request for
arbitration within thirty (30) calendar days after union
notice as against the written requirement of a request,
" . . . within thirty (30) calendar days of the original
event of the grievance"; and, in failing to determine
that the union did have notice of the anticipated adoption
and failed to pursue its remedies in a reasonable fashion.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully submits that the judgment
of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARDS AND RICHARDS

By
Gary A. Frank
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
1515 Walker Bank Building
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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